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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION TO
OVERRULE ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY
I. INTRODUCTION
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily' the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
state police search of a student newspaper office
based on traditional procedures for obtaining a
search warrant against third parties not implicated
in any crime.2 The Court refused to rule that the
first or fourth amendment rights of the newspaper
required police, before conducting a search for
evidence, to obtain a subpoena and to rely on
voluntary compliance by the innocent third party
to deliver the evidence. Amid wide and continuing
criticism of the decision as insensitive to the first
amendment rights of the institutional media,3
members of Congress responded to the Court's
suggestion in Stanford Daily that statutory protec-
tion against search warrant abuses could be devel-
oped.4
In 1978 and 1979 numerous bills5 were intro-
duced in Congress imposing a variety of additional
procedures on law enforcement officials seeking to
obtain warrants to search places not implicated in
1436 U.S. 547 (1978).
2 Justice White wrote the majority opinion on behalf
of five Justices, including Justice Powell, who also wrote
a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion, as did Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justice
Marshall.
3 See, e.g., Citizens Privacy Protection Act: Hearings on S.
3162 and S. 3164 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3
(1978) (statement of Sen. Bayh) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Senate Hearings]; Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Hearings on H.R.
3486 and HR. 4181 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm.
on theJudiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-5 (1979) (statement
of William Small, CBS, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1979
House Hearings]. See generally The Court and the Press, NEws-
WrEK, June 26, 1978, at 93; High Court vs. the Press, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1979, §6 (Magazine), at 76.
4 436 U.S. at 567. See generally Bayh, Police Searches of
Innocent Third Parties: A Congressional Response to Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 6J. LEois. 7 (1979).
5 At least 14 bills were introduced in the 95th Congress:
S. 3162, S. 3164, S. 3222, S. 3225, S. 3258, S. 3261, H.R.
3376, H.R. 12952, H.R. 13017, H.R. 13113, H.R. 13168,
H.R. 13227, H.R. 13319, H.R. 13710, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978). At least 13 bills were introduced in the 96th
Congress: S. 115, S. 855, S. 1790, H.R. 283, H.R. 322,
H.R. 323, H.R. 368, H.R. 380, H.R. 1293, H.R. 1305,
H.R. 1373, H.R. 1437, H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
crimes. The requirement common to the bills was
that the government must show probable cause to
believe that the person possessing the material had
committed or was committing the criminal offense
for which the materials were sought. The bills,
however, varied with regard to which persons and
places should be protected.
6
Of special interest, however, were the constitu-
tional bases set forth in the bills for imposing the
additional requirements on state, as well as federal,
law enforcement officials. There was little doubt
that Congress could bind federal officials through
the necessary and proper clause.7 Of less certainty
was the proper rationale, if any, for extending such
restraints to state police searches of third parties.
One theory posited that the work-product of media
offices subject to third-party searches could be
classified as material "in and affecting" commerce
among the states, and thus searches involving such
material were subject to Congress' authority to
regulate interstate commerce pursuant to the com-
merce clause.8 An alternate theory posited that
Congress had the power to regulate state searches
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
which provides that Congress may "enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the
amendment.9 Under this rationale, Congress may
pass legislation to protect the first and fourth
amendment rights of third parties, rights that are
applied to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Virtually identical issues faced Congress several
years earlier in the wake of bills introduced follow-
ing the Branzburg v. Hayes decision,'0 in which the
court refused to allow reporters to claim a consti-
tutional privilege against revealing confidential
news sources to grand juries. These issues were not
confronted at that time, however, since a national
6 Some bills were limited to protecting the materials of
the print and broadcast media, e.g., H.R. 3486, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), while other bills, e.g., S. 3162,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), extended protection to all
third parties.
7 U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 18. See United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Logan v. United
States, 144 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1892).8 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §5.
to 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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shield law to protect reporters was never enacted."
This comment will examine alternate rationales
for imposing on the states federal standards regu-
lating third-party searches. First, the ability of
Congress to regulate such searches under modern
commerce clause theory-including the recent re-
vival of the tenth amendment as a barrier to the
exercise of such power-will be examined critically.
The main focus of analysis under the commerce
clause power will be a bill introduced in 1979,
supported by the Carter administration. Second,
the reach of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
in light of case law and scholarly commentary also
will be questioned as a basis for extending the
requirements imposed by the bills to the states.'
2
This comment will conclude that there are serious
doubts as to whether either rationale provides a
sufficient basis for extending such requirements to
state law enforcement officials.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE RATIONALE
MODERN COMMERCE CLAUSE THEORY
The commerce clause gives Congress power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states."' 3 In the bills overruling
Stanford Daily, Congress is constructing a noncon-
stitutional framework to protect what it perceives
as the first and fourth amendment rights of third
parties subject to state searches. Such a framework
can be supported by the commerce clause in two
ways.14 First, Congress can define the activities or
materials that are in or affect interstate commerce.
Examining the constitutionality of a statute
grounded on this definitional rationale requires the
statute to be considered on its face to determine
whether the activity or material can be reached
under the commerce power. Second, Congress can
enact a general regulation of activity or material
in or affecting interstate commerce; courts in each
" See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTIrtrrIONAL LAW 1451 (9th ed. 1975); Dixon, News-
men's Privilege by Federal Legislation: Within Congressional
Power?, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 39 (1974). However, the
efforts to pass national shield legislation were revived
following In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See Congress Could Enact Shield
if Press Unites Behind It, 64 A.B.A. J. 1829 (1978).
12 A third basis on which Congress might reach state
searches was not employed by any bill; Congress could
attach conditions regarding searches to federal grants to
the states. See note 75 infra.
I' U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
14 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186, 197 n.12 (1974); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 152 (1971); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
120-21 (1941).
instance must inquire whether the activity or ma-
terial falls under the statutory language. A statute
grounded on the latter rationale poses no consti-
tutional problems on its face since a court in each
case will determine the proper jurisdiction of the
statute.
In 1979 the Carter administration announced its
support for one of the bills introduced to overrule
Stanford Daily-the First Amendment Privacy Pro-
tection Act of 1979.15 This bill followed the second
approach available to Congress under the com-
merce power and did not define activities or ma-
terial that are in or affect commerce. The drafters
of the Act decided, after expressing concern about
Congress' ability to reach state searches under the
definitional approach,1i to allow courts to deter-
mine jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. While the
Privacy Protection Act does not rely on the defi-
nitional approach, that rationale is worth consid-
ering in order to examine the Carter administra-
tion's decision to pursue the alternate route. More-
over, this examination will provide a guide for
determining the reach of the statutory language
under the case-by-case approach adopted by the
administration.
Since the 1930's, the Supreme Court has given
Congress broad authority to regulate interstate
commerce and activities affecting commerce. Mod-
em commerce clause theory provides three general
methods whereby Congress can regulate com-
merce. First, Congress can regulate the shipment
of material in interstate commerce or regulate in-
terstate movement itself. Second, Congress can pro-
tect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
Third, Congress can regulate any activity that has
a close and substantial relationship to, or affect on,
commerce. The latter power extends to intrastate
activities that, when taken together, have a cumu-
lative affect on commerce.
17
u H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). In March
1980 the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on
Titles I and IV of S. 1790, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
which together are identical in text to H.R. 3486.
16 Officials from the Department of Justice expressed
reservations at the hearings for the bills overruling Stanford
Daily and in official policy statements. See 1978 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 44, 334 (statements of Asst. Atty.
Gen. Heymann); Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Memorandum, Re: Constitutionality of Bills In-
troduced in Response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 1-2
(1978) (unpublished memorandum) [hereinafter cited as
OLC Memo]. The Department had similar concerns
about bills introduced in response to Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972). See Dixon, supra note 11, at 46-48.
17 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
See also G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 171-228; J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-59
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To limit the result of the Court's decision in
Stanford Daily, Congress under the commerce power
can either directly prohibit state searches of speci-
fied third parties or prohibit state searches of des-
ignated material possessed by third parties. The
desired result in either case may be essentially the
same, but different commerce power rationales
must be applied to support each rationale.
Congressional authority to restrict search proce-
dures of state law enforcement officials directly
would fall under the third source of commerce
power, the "affecting commerce" rationale.' s To
be cognizable under this prong of the commerce
power, the activity sought to be regulated-in this
case, state police searches of media or other third
party materials-must have a substantial relation-
ship to, or an effect on, interstate commerce. To
prohibit state searches of all third parties arguably
would extend beyond Congress' admittedly broad
power to regulate activities that impact on com-
merce. The Court consistently has reiterated that
the regulated activity must have a close and sub-
stantial relationship with, or effect on, commerce. 19
If such language is to be given any content, it must
suggest that at some point activities that may have
a slight effect on commerce will not fall under
Congress' use of the commerce power to reach that
activity.
20
However, a single activity which, when taken
together with other instances of the same activity,
theoretically might affect commerce can fall under
the third commerce power. The source of this
principle is Wickard v. Filburn,21 where the Court
found that a class of intrastate activities (growing
grain for local consumption), when taken as a
whole, would affect interstate commerce. Similarly,
state police searches and the potential for such
searches taken as a whole could disrupt media
offices and discourage disclosure from confidential
sources of information. Such interference could
(1978). An additional power of Congress, the ability to
regulate intrastate activities if the regulation is necessary
to regulate the interstate shipment of goods, is often cited.
See G. GuNrHER, supra note 11, at 188-203. This power
can be regarded as a subspecies of the first power.
1s The other commerce powers would not be applica-
ble. State police searches are not in the flow of comitierce
and are not instrumentalities of commerce.
9 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filbur, 317 U.S.
111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
120 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
20 See G. GtNTHEaR, supra note 11, at 182, 191-203.
2' 3 17 U.S. 111 (1942).
affect adversely the news gathering and news dis-
seminating functions of media operations and
thereby impact on commerce.22 Thus, state police
searches of the institutional media-which can be
conceptualized as including both national news
media organizations and local media outlets-the-
oretically could have a discernible impact on com-
merce. The relation to commerce of searches of
other third parties, however, is far more tenuous.
The Court recently has stated that the Wickard
principle does not allow Congress to use "a rela-
tively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for
broad general regulation of state or private activi-
ties."23 State police searches of the homes or offices
of any third party, theoretically, would have no
discernible effect on commerce and would seem to
be a classic case of a relatively trivial impact on
commerce.2
Even if a statute is limited to state police searches
of media offices, the impact on commerce, whether
viewed from an empirical or theoretical basis, may
be minimal. The Court in Stanford Daily was not
persuaded that news operations would be disrupted
in any substantial manner by the fear of warranted
searches. 2 There have been approximately fifteen
warranted searches of media offices since 1970.26
Even assuming that the fifteen searches were dis-
ruptive and affected the media offices' ability to
engage in commerce, the impact would appear to
be minimal. Given the miniscule number of
22 See generally Communications Law Clinic, New York
Law School, Memorandum, Re: Constitutionality of Pro-
posed Federal Legislation Overruling Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily (1979) (unpublished memorandum), reprinted in
1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 338 [hereinafter cited
as CLC Memo]. See also Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 957, 986-91 (1976).
TMaryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968).
While the holding in Maryland v. Wirtz was overruled by
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
-the commerce clause reasoning was not impaired. See J.
NowAK, R. ROTuNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 160-
61.
24 In fairness to the drafters of bills overruling Stanford
Daily, it should be noted that restricting bills to protect
only the "media" or "press" presents significant difficul-
ties of definition and classification. See generally 1978 Senate
.Hearings, supra note 3, at 53 (statements of Asst. Atty.
Gen. Heymann and Sen. Mathias); 1979 House Hearings,
supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Hey-
mann). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-
05 (1972).
25 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978).
26 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 135 (state-
ment ofJack Landau, Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press) (records indicate 15 searches of recognized
news organizations since 1970-2 by federal officials, 13
by state officials).
1980]
searches that have been conducted, there is little
evidence that the possibility of warranted searches
affects media performance in any meaningful way.
The hearings on the bills overruling Stanford Daily
revealed almost a total lack of objective evidence
as to the impact of warranted searches on the
commercial business of the institutional media.
2 7
In more recent commerce clause adjudication,
however, the Court has been willing to rely on
congressional findings or hearings to determine the
actual or theoretical impact of the activity on
commerce. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States,s which upheld the constitution-
ality of title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,29 the
Court stated a two-part test to answer the consti-
tutional question: Whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding that the object of regulation af-
fected commerce and whether the means of regu-
lation were reasonable and appropriate.3 0 While
the Act contained no findings relevant to these
tests, the Court found the legislative record ample
to support an affirmative determination that the
local activities that were regulated had a "substan-
tial and harmful effect upon" commerce.
3
1
Similarly, in Perez v. United States32 the Court held
that there was a rational basis for the congressional
findings that intrastate loansharking activities as a
whole affected interstate commerce and that such
activity could be regulated despite the lack of
2
7 See also OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 10 (empirical
evidence indicates "the lack" of a general, nationwide
problem).
Several authorities also point toward title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976), as providing adequate prec-
edent for Congress to impose requirements on state law
enforcement activities that have no substantial impact
on commerce. See, e.g., CLC Memo, supra note 22, at 336;
American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum, Re:
Congressional Power to Restrict Third-Party Searches by
State and Local Officials (1978) (unpublished memoran-
dum), reprinted in 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 49
[hereinafter cited as ACLU Memo]. Title III prohibits
federal and state officials from wiretapping an establish-
ment, "'the operation of which affects interstate and
foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (l)(b)(iv). This sec-
tion, proponents argue, is analogous to bills overruling
Stanford Daily. To the extent that title III reaches activities
having no substantial relation to, or effect on, interstate
commerce, it may suffer from the same constitutional
infirmities that this comment outlines regarding the bills
to overrule Stanford Daily. See generally OLC Memo, supra
note 16, at 8-10.
*s3 7 9 U.S. 241 (1964).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(e)(1976).
30 379 U.S. at 258-59.
3' Id. at 258.
32 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
evidence that the particular loansharking under
prosecution affected interstate commerce.33
Applying these principles to the present issue,
the courts would be willing to defer to congressional
findings or a legislative record that rationally con-
cluded that searches by state officials, and the
potential for such searches, of media offices and
other protected third parties would substantially
impact on interstate commerce.34 Thus, a court
should be amenable to accepting the legislative
record supporting such bills if, as in Heart of Atlanta
Motel and Perez, it finds that Congress had a ra-
tional basis, based on the evidence before it, to link
searches of the covered third parties to impairment
of commerce. While the arguments advanced
above 5 suggest that such a link is not compelling
on either a theoretical or empirical basis sufficient
to convince a court on its own review of the facts,
it is unlikely that Congress has not met the lower
standard of rationality delineated in Heart of Atlanta
Motel and Perez. In short, the legislative record
currently before Congress is sufficient to support a
bill prohibiting searches of media offices.
Congress also can reach state searches by pro-
hibiting all searches of any third-party material in
or affecting commerce. The power underlying this
approach would be the second source of commerce
power, the ability of Congress to protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce.3 1 In a variety
of other contexts, such as prohibiting thefts from
interstate shipments, 7 Congress has protected the
flow of interstate commerce. Similarly, the prohi-
bition of state searches of the papers of third parties
may be regarded as protecting the flow of com-
merce.
However, all written material possessed by any
third party could not be protected under this prong
of the commerce power. Rather, only the materials
used by persons or organizations engaged in inter-
state commerce would be protected. Unlike the
33 Id. at 154-57.
4 The hearings before Congress in 1978 and 1979
regarding the bills here considered were replete with
testimony from representatives of the media, as well as
from members of Congress, concerning what they saw as
the deleterious effects of the holding in Stanford Daily on
the effective functioning of the nation's media in gath-
ering and disseminating news. For a brief congressional
report to the same effect, see H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
35 See text accompanying notes 18-27 supra.
36 See note 17 & accompanying text supra.3 7 See 18 U.S.C. §659 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. §32
(1976) (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. §33 (1976)
(theft of motor vehicles).
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analysis employed above to determine whether an
activity affects commerce, the instrumentality the-
ory should be given a more restrictive meaning. An
object is an instrumentality of interstate commerce
only to the extent that the use of the object is
necessary for the activity in question to continue in
interstate commerce.ss In the context of the present
issue, only the materials of media organizations
operating on an interstate basis should be consid-
ered instrumentalities of commerce. Thus, a bill
premised on the "instruments" theory would reach
a smaller class of state searches than searches cov-
ered by a bill premised on the "affecting com-
merce" theory.
THE SHERMAN ACT ANALOGY
Cognizant of the constitutional uncertainty sur-
rounding the ability of Congress to reach state
searches under the commerce power, the drafters
of the Privacy Protection Act did not define any
activity or material that is in or affects commerce.39
The Act prohibits the search or seizure by federal
or state officials of any "work-product" or "docu-
mentary" materials "possessed by a person in con-
nection with a purpose to disseminate to the public
a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form
of public communication, in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce.
40
-s There has been no court adjudication of federal
statutes protecting instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce. Thus, there are nojudicial interpretations of what
constitutes an "instrumentality of commerce." By its
plain meaning, however, the term refers to an object that
is necessary for an activity to engage in interstate com-
merce. It should not refer to materials used by any third
party whose activities only may affect commerce.
9 See note 16 & accompanying text supra. The intent
of the drafters of the Privacy Protection Act to follow the
Sherman Act analogy is apparent from the hearings and
statutory language, see notes 43-47 & accompanying text
infra, although the Sherman Act was never mentioned by
officials from the Department of Justice.
40 H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), (b) (1979).
The bill requires federal and state officials to use the
subpoena process to obtain the protected materials of
third parties. Two exceptions to the search prohibition
for work-product materials are provided: if there is prob-
able cause to believe that the person possessing the
material has committed or is committing the offense for
which the materials are sought, §2(a)(1), and if there is
reason to believe that immediate seizure of the materials
is necessary to save a life, §2(a)(2). Four exceptions to
the search prohibition for documentary materials are
provided. The first two exceptions, §2(b)(l), (2), parallel
the two exceptions for work-product materials. The last
two exceptions are if there is reason to believe that giving
notice pursuant to a subpoena would result in the destruc-
tion of the material, §2(b)(3), and if the materials have
The Privacy Protection Act is thus analogous to
section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,4' which
prohibits certain activities that are in or affect
commerce. In each Sherman Act case, courts must
determine whether the activity sought to be
reached by the substantive portion of the Sherman
Act is in or affects interstate commerce.
4 2
In the Privacy Protection Act the "in or affect-
ing" commerce language refers to the media ma-
terials sought to be protected, not to the searches
sought to be prohibited.4 ' Therefore, in each case
arising under the Privacy Protection Act, a court
must determine whether the searched materials
were in or affecting commerce. The drafters of the
Act intended that the statutory language should
govern the materials to be protected: 44 those ma--
terials held "in connection with a purpose to dis-
seminate... [a] form of public communication.,
45
Thus, the materials sought to be protected must
satisfy both a statutory and a constitutional in-
quiry. Under the statutory analysis, a court must
determine first, whether the materials are con-
nected "with a purpose to disseminate" communi-
cation to the public. The drafters intended this
language to reach all materials meant to be pub-
lished or incorporated in a form of public com-
munication and all materials gathered and pre-
pared in anticipation of publication. 6 The second
statutory inquiry is whether the material was part
of a "form of public communication." The drafters
intended this language to cover any written com-
munication available to the general public.4 7 Once
these tests are satisfied, the constitutional inquiry
would involve a determination of whether the ma-
terials were in or affected commerce.
For the constitutional inquiry, the "in com-
merce" and "affecting commerce" analysis out-
lined above would be applicable. Under the "in
commerce" analysis, the materials would have to
be used by persons or organizations engaged in the
not been produced in compliance with the subpoena,
§2(b)(4). Finally, the bill does not apply to any search
related to the enforcement of the customs laws. Id. §3.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
42 See generally P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 120-22
(2d ed. 1974); L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANzrrusT 708-14
(1977).43 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 18-19 (state-
ment of Asst. Atty. Gen. Heymann).
4Id. at 11.
45 H.R. 3486, 96th Cong., §2(a), (b) (1979).46 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 11 (statement
of Asst. Atty. Gen. Heymann).
47 id.
flow of interstate commerce.48 Under the "affecting
commerce" analysis, the materials would have to
affect commerce in a substantial manner.49 In
either case, the Act would appear to reach only
materials utilized by national news media organi-
zations. Only in such large, multistate organiza-
tions would written materials satisfy the constitu-
tional prerequisites of being in the flow of com-
merce or of having a likelihood of substantially
affecting commerce. Strictly intrastate media op-
erations, such as the student newspaper involved
in Stanford Daily, probably would not send publi-
cations or broadcasts outside the state, thus failing
the "in commerce" test; because of their small size,
they would be unlikely to affect substantially the
dissemination of news on a national basis, thus
failing the "affecting commerce" test. By applying
the jurisdictional language to materials, not activ-
ities, the drafters of the Privacy Protection Act may
have restricted5° the scope of the protection af-
forded by the Act unnecessarily.
THE TENTH AMENDMENT BARRIER
The most recent addition to commerce clause
jurisprudence has been the imposition of the tenth
amendment 5' as a barrier to congressional exercise
of the commerce power in a way that interferes
with the sovereign functions of the states. In 1976
the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery52 held
unconstitutional the 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act 53 that extended wage-and-
hour requirements under the Act to virtually all
state and local government employees. Under cur-
rent tenth amendment analysis, the Privacy Pro-
tection Act, assuming it applies to state law enforce-
ment officials through the commerce clause, must
be measured against the restrictions found in the
National League of Cities decision.
In striking down the 1974 amendments, the
National League of Cities Court outlined the contours
of state sovereignty which could not be impaired
by Congress through the commerce clause. The
48 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
'9 See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
o See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra (suggesting
that certain state searches could be reached under "af-
fecting commerce" grounds).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
52 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"3 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) (declared unconstitutional in
part, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
Court stated that certain state governmental func-
tions that are "essential to separate and indepen-
dent existence"' 4 are immune to congressional in-
terference. After canvassing the anticipated costs
associated with meeting the wage-and-hour re-
quirements and further pointing out that the deliv-
ery of government services would be displaced and
restructured by the requirements, 55 the Court con-
cluded that the 1974 amendments impermissibly
interfered "with the integral government func-
tions" 56 of states and their subdivisions:
[The amendments will] significantly alter or displace
the States' abilities to structure employer-employee
relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation .... [I]t is functions such as these which
governments are created to provide, services such as
these which the States have traditionally afforded
their citizens.... We hold that insofar as the chal-
lenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions, they are
not within the authority granted Congress by [the
commerce clause].57
By imposing national requirements on search
procedures by state and local law enforcement
officials, the Privacy Protection Act would seem to
interfere with "integral" and "traditional" govern-
ment functions and services. The Court in National
League of Cities found "police protection" to be a
traditional government function, 58 and on other
occasions the Court has emphasized the right of
states to fashion their own law enforcement pro-
cedures. 59 The imposition of a national subpoena
requirement to replace third-party warrant
searches has the potential to "seriously undermine
law enforcement efforts."0 A subpoena require-
ment would eliminate the element of surprise in
searches and thereby facilitate destruction of evi-
dence by third parties.65 Moreover, those state and




59 See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977); Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963). See generally OLC
Memo, supra note 16, at 5-6.
6 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 560.
61 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 297-98
(statement of Paul Perito, National District Attorneys
Association); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 165-66
(statement of Richard Williams, National District Attor-
neys Association); Brief for the United States as Amicus
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local jurisdictions that have no legislative basis for
the issuance of subpoenas would be required to
rely on grandjuries to return prosecutor's subpoena
requests. The delay associated with obtaining sub-
poenas through such a method would be protracted
by the limited function and availability of grand
juries in many states.62 Thus, in addition to mod-
ifying police investigative procedures, the Privacy
Protection Act would require state and local juris-
dictions to restructure their methods of issuing
subpoenas if they wish to be able to obtain them
more readily.
If the imposition on state sovereignty principles
derived from National League of Cities is viewed
exclusively as an empirical assessment of financial
burden on the states, then the Privacy Protection
Act could be held valid more easily, since the direct
financial burden resulting from the Act would be
somewhat intangible. 63 This reading of the deci-
sion, however, is narrow and untenable. The Court
only referred to the fiscal burden as one aspect of
the imposition on state sovereignty, and the Court's
broad reasoning did not emphasize monetary ex-
pense as the sole basis for the principle underlying
Curiae at 25-26, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978), reprinted inJustice Department Policy Concerning News
Media Search Warrants: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 144-
45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Justice Department Policy
Hearings]; Note, supra note 22, at 973-74.
62 See note 61 supra. However, the exceptions to the
prohibition of the use of search warrants in the Privacy
Protection Act, note 40 supra, may mitigate the Act's
disruption of state law enforcement functions.
At least one court has addressed the tenth amendment
implications of a national subpoena requirement indi-
rectly. In In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d
589 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978), the Illinois attorney general argued that his staff's
compliance with a federal grand jury subpoena would
violate state sovereignty principles outlined by National
League of Cities. In rejecting this argument, the court of
appeals stated that "the impact of a subpoena on state
functions is markedly different from the Usey direct
system of regulation that requires reallocation of state
resources." 581 F.2d at 592. This reasoning can be readily
distinguished from a tenth amendment challenge to the
Privacy Protection Act. Unlike a single federal grand
jury investigation, the Privacy Protection Act would
affect state officials nationwide. Moreover, the Act would
affect the routine functions of police rather than merely
the office of a single state official.
63 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 63-64 (state-
ment of Prof. Mark Tushnet); ACLU Memo, supra note
27, at 47. But see text accompanying notes 60-62 supra
(suggesting state and local jurisdictions may experience
significant costs in implementing a subpoena-only re-
quirement).
its decision.64 Rather, the displacement (of which
the fiscal burden was the cause) of local govern-
ment discretion in deciding how to deliver services
was the factor that proved decisive for the Court. 6s
The approach taken in Professor Laurence
Tribe's interpretation of National League of Cities
suffers from a similarly narrow reading of the case.
Tribe argues that the decision is best viewed as
reaffirming state autonomy only to the extent nec-
essary to ensure an individual's constitutional right
to receive government services.66 This view is un-
conventional and not supported by case law.
67
However, even if it were accepted, it would not aid
in determining how National League of Cities should
be applied to the Privacy Protection Act. It is not
clear how the Act shields the individual rights
Tribe describes; on the one hand, the Act purports
to protect the first and fourth amendment rights of
the media and other third parties, but on the other
hand, the Act arguably could dilute an individual's
right to receive effective police services from the
government. Therefore, Tribe's analysis fails to
offer any basis for predicting the constitutional
validity of the Act under National League of Cities.
The adoption of Justice Blackmun's interpreta-
tion of National League of Cities, however, may result
in the Act being upheld. Blackmun, who provided
the crucial vote for the five-member majority, ex-
plained in his concurring opinion that the decision
adopted a balancing test, with federal interests
being weighed against state interests. 68 While the
majority did not formulate its holding in those
terms, such a reading of the decision is suggested
by the Court's refusal to overrule Fiy v. United
"See J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNo, supra note
17, at 162; L. TRIBE,-AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAw 311
(1978); OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 5 & n.5.
6 426 U.S. at 848.
66 L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 313-18. At least one
authority, in attempting to support the Privacy Protec-
tion Act on commerce clause grounds, cites Tribe in an
effort to distinguish National League of Cities. See CLO
Memo, supra note 22, at 338-39.67 Tribe so characterizes his own interpretation. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 64, at 313 n.28, 314.
" 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J.,. concurring). Black-
mun suggested the imposition of federal environmental
standards on the states as one area "where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater." Id. It should be noted,
however, that lower federal courts which have considered
National League of Cities have always relied on the reason-
ing in the majority opinion, not on Blackmun's balancing
test. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Pearce v. City of Wichita Falls, 590
F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan,
577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).
1980]
States. 9 In Fry, the Court upheld the imposition of
federal wage controls on state employees, and the
National League of Cities Court found several factors
to distinguish such controls from the 1974 amend-
ments: that the problem of inflation could be dealt
with only on a national basis, that the controls
were only for a limited time period, and that they
displaced no state choices as to how government
operations should be structured.70
The analysis of Fry suggests that Blackmun's
balancing approach can be viewed in two ways: as
a utilitarian analysis of the net benefits of the
federal interest to be weighed against the net losses
of invading state sovereignty or as turning on the
nature, not the weight, of the federal interest ad-
vanced to justify state submission. 7 ' The latter view
is the more plausible one, since, as noted above,
72
National League of Cities did not turn on the financial
burden imposed on the states. Applying the second
view requires the difficult weighing of the federal
interest in upholding the first and fourth amend-
ment rights of the media and related third parties73
against the state interest in retaining traditional
police investigative procedures. Under Blackmun's
analysis, the lenient rationality test for evaluating
congressional judgments as to which activities af-
fect commerce7 4 would not be applicable. Rather,
Congress would need to show that current state
search warrant practices have the present danger
or future potential for inhibiting the gathering and
dissemination of news on a national basis by the
third parties the Privacy Protection Act covers.
Given the paucity of evidence concerning the abuse
of search warrants against the media and other
third parties on a national or local level, it is
doubtful that the record currently before Congress
0 4 2 1 U.S. 542 (1975).
70 426 U.S. at 853.
71 This interpretation of Blackmun's opinion is sug-
gested by Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Feder-
alism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environ-
mental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1235-37 (1977).
7 See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
7s The drafters of the Privacy Protection Act were not
intending to enhance the nation's commerce as such
through the bill. Therefore, the federalism interest must
rest on the much narrower ground of protecting the rights
of persons and organizations within each state.. This
formulation makes the federalism interest under the "na-
ture" analysis even more difficult to justify. See Stewart,
supra note 71, at 1237. However, there might be spillover
effects to other states in that an impairment of the ability
of the media of one state to disseminate news would
affect those out-of-staters who wished to hear the news.
This formulation makes the federalism interest easier to
justify. Id.
74 See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
is sufficient to generate a federalism interest capa-
ble of supporting the Privacy Protection Act.79
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RATIONALE
KA TZENBACH V. MORGAN and OREGON V.
MITCHELL
A second constitutional basis for the application
of bills overruling Stanford Daily to the states is
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, also re-
ferred to as the enforcement clause, which gives
Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions" of the amendment.
76
Several of the bills currently before Congress,77
unlike the Privacy Protection Act, are premised on
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Since the
Court has applied first and fourth amendment
guarantees to the states through incorporation into
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, 78 proponents of this approach argue that the
bills are enforcing congressional determinations of
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
notwithstanding the contrary determination
reached by the Court in Stanford Daily.79 However,
75 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra. See also
OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 6 (suggesting that Congress
is required to make a "substantial record" of abuse of
search warrants by state officials to justify a federalism
interest under Blackmun's balancing analysis).
There is another possible basis of supporting congres-
sional imposition of media-search standards upon the
states. Congress, acting pursuant to the federal spending
power, could require states accepting federal grants to
comply with proposed search standards. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, el. 1. No bill has taken this approach, partially
because of the inflexibility of relying on uncertain yearly
appropriations. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at
117 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). One example of
such a condition is a requirement that all states receiving
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants ad-
here to the restrictions found in the Privacy Protection
Act. The constitutional limitations on such conditions
are that they be related to the purpose of the spending
(a limitation arguably not breached in the above exam-
ple) and, possibly, that they not invade state autonomy
interests. Such state interests would relate to the tenth
amendment analysis outlined above. See generally G.
GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 250-59; Comment, Toward
New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 726 (1977).
The Court in National League of Cities, however, expressly
reserved the question of the effect of its decision on other
sections of the Constitution, such as the spending power.
426 U.S. at 852 n.17.76 
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §5.
77 See, e.g., S. 3162, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R.
4181, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
78 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorpo-
ration of the fourth amendment); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporation of the first amend-
ment).
79 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978).
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this rationale must be considered in light of the
Court's interpretation of the enforcement clause in
Katzenbach v. Morgans° and Oregon v. Mitchell,"' which
casts doubt on Congress' power to determine the
substantive content of the fourteenth amendment.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 196582 as a proper
exercise of the enforcement clause power. Section
4(e) provided that the right to vote could not be
denied by a state for illiteracy in English to any
person who completed the sixth grade in a Puerto
Rican school in which the language of instruction
was other than English. A New York state law
provided otherwise, and the Supreme Court in
1959 had upheld a similar state literacy require-
ment against an equal protection challenge.'
The majority opinion by Justice Brennan upheld
section 4(e) of the Act on two grounds. First,
Congress had the power to grant Puerto Ricans the
right to vote as a means to aid them in securing
equality in the statE's distribution of public ser-
vices-education, housing, and law enforcement. 84
The Court's standard for testing the exercise of this
remedial power was a lenient one of simply "per-
ceiving a basis" on which Congress could have
resolved the conflicting federal and state interests
involved in passing section 4 (e) of the Act." As a
second ground for its decision, the majority indi-
cated that Congress could have concluded that the
literacy test violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.a6 Again, the Court
stated that it was Congress' prerogative to weigh
the competing considerations, and it was enough
that the Court "perceive a basis" upon which
Congress might predicate such a judgment.8 The
"o 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
8'400 U.S. 112 (1970).
82 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§4(e), 79 Stat. 438 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973b(e)
(1976)).
8 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45 (1959).
' 384 U.S. at 652-53.
85 Id. at 653.
" Id. at 656.
87 Id. Justice Brennan apparently derived the "perceive
a basis" test from his discussion, earlier in the opinion, of
the relatively lenient rationality test for congressional
legislation found in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). See 384 U.S. at 650-51. It should
be noted that while little of the vast historical scholarship
regarding the fourteenth amendment concerns §5, what
can be discerned of the intent of the framers of §5
supports arguments for deference to congressional inter-
pretations of the amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEE.NTH AMENDMENT 221-29 (1977). But see Bickel, The
first rationale granted Congress power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment as a basis for remedying
past violations of the amendment. The second
rationale gave Congress power to determine the
meaning of provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment for itself and pass legislation directed at
enforcing that determination, notwithstanding the
Court's prior determination to the contrary.
A strong dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by
Justice Stewart, challenged the majority on both
grounds. Harlan rejected the application of the
remedy rationale since there were no legislative
facts to support a finding that Puerto Ricans in
New York state had been discriminated against in
the delivery of government services.88 More impor-
tant, in rejecting the second rationale, Harlan ar-
gued that whether there was a violation of the
equal protection clause was a judicial question
which Congress could not answer; section 5 did not
give Congress power to define the substantive scope
of the fourteenth amendment. 89 If Congress had
such power, he suggested, it could dilute as well as
expand equal protection and due process decisions
of the Court.90 In response to this contention, the
majority stated in a footnote that section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment grants Congress no such
discretion: "Congress' power under § 5 is limited
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of
the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."
91
The broad enforcement clause power the Morgan
Court gave to Congress must be weighed against
the much more restrictive reasoning found in Oregon
v. Mitchell.92 Such a balancing is extremely difficult,
however, since the lengthy and complicated deci-
sion in Oregon v. Mitchell produced no majority
opinion; three Justices authored their own opin-
ions, and two other opinions were each joined by
three Justices. So far as is pertinent here, the Court
considered the 1970 Voting Rights Act amend-
ments that lowered the voting age to eighteen for
Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 97; Burt,
Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 81, 101 (both authors suggest, based on historical
evidence, that §5 grants Congress power to legislate only
when thejudiciary determines that a state law constitutes
a denial of a fourteenth amendment right).
88 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
89 Id. at 667-68.
9 Id. at 668.
9' Id. at 651 n.10.
92 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
all federal and state elections93 and suspended for
five years the use of literacy tests in any federal or
state election.9 By shifting five-four majorities, the
Court upheld the age limitation provision as it
applied to federal elections, but invalidated the
provision as it applied to state elections. The sus-
pension of literacy tests was upheld unanimously.
Justice Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices
Marshall and White, adhered most closely to the
broad language of Morgan. Brennan, who would
have upheld the application of the eighteen-year-
old provision to state elections, expressed doubts as
to whether a statute granting the franchise to
persons older than twenty-one while denying it to
eighteen year olds would survive equal protection
scrutiny.9 5 Regardless of the Court's view, however,
Brennan argued that Congress' factfinding capa-
bilities were superior to those of the Court and
justified a congressional determination, based on
the enforcement clause, that a state law denying
the vote to persons between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one was unnecessary to promote any
legitimate state interest and thus discriminated
against that class in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause.9
In a footnote to his opinion, apparently meant
to indicate that limitations still existed on the
second Morgan rationale, Brennan elaborated on
his Morgan footnote, which limited congressional
exercise of the enforcement clause to only 'enforc-
ing' the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.
When the Court strikes down a state law on con-
stitutional grounds, Brennan argued, it indicates,
among other things, that the legislative findings
supporting the law were "so far wrong as to be
unreasonable."9' If Congress were to make "iden-
tical findings on the identical issue," then its judg-
ment would also fail to pass the Court's reason-
ableness standard of review.98 Apparently, Brennan
was suggesting a hypothetical case illustrating the
limitation: If Congress were to enact a law
grounded on section 5 that was identical to a state
law struck down by the Court as violative of the
fourteenth amendment, the federal law could not
be upheld unless Congress based the law on find-
ings and evidence different from those advanced
by the state legislature.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb-I (1970).
94 Id. § 1973 aa.
95 400 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., with White & Mar-
shall, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
96 Id. at 246-49.
97 Id. at 249 n.31.
9Id.
The other pivotal opinion was that of Justice
Stewart,joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Blackmun. In his construction of Morgan, Stewart,
who would have struck down the eighteen-year-old
provision as it applied to either state or federal
elections, upheld the first, remedial prong but
placed severe restrictions on the second, interpre-
tative prong. On the interpretative power, Stewart
argued that Congress could override state laws "on
the ground that they were in fact used as instru-
ments of invidious discrimination," even though a
court in a lawsuit might not reach the same factual
conclusion." Stewart concluded that his invidious
discrimination limitation prevented Congress from
determining "as a matter of substantive constitu-
tional law what situations"' 0 violate the equal
protection clause, unless the state law discrimi-
nated "against any discrete and insular minor-
ity."' 01 Since Stewart limited congressional inter-
pretative power under section 5 to overriding those
state laws discriminating against traditionally "sus-
pect" classifications, apparently only as determined
by the Court itself, Congress could not overturn
the state voting laws classifying persons on the
basis of age, which was not a suspect category.
10 2
Based on the convoluted voting pattern in Oregon
v. Mitchell, it is difficult to abstract any principles
from that decision which modify the precedential
value of Morgan. Moreover, the Court since 1970
has had little more to say on the two decisions
beyond perfunctory citations. 0 3 In Mitchell, all the
Justices expressed their willingness to support the
remedial rationale of Morgan. It is important to
note, however, that had the second Morgan ration-
ale remained in full force, the Oregon v. Mitchell
majority undoubtedly would have sustained the
eighteen-year-old provision, just as a Court major-
ity had sustained the Voting Rights Act provision
in Morgan. However, five Justices were unwilling to
do so; the Stewart group of three limited this aspect
of Morgan to situations involving suspect classifica-
9Id. at 296 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J., and Black-
mun, J., concurring and dissenting). Unlike Justice Bren-
nan, Justice Stewart found it "inconceivable" that the
Court would find the denial of the franchise to persons
between 18 and 21 years of age a denial of equal protec-




"o'See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., with Powell and
Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (discussed congressional stat-
ute granting standing, citing Morgan and Oregon v. Mitch-
ell).
COMMENTS [Vol. 71
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION TO OVERRULE ZURCHER
tions, while Justices Black and Harlan found limits
on the section 5 power in the history of the enact-
ment of the fourteenth amendment. These limits,
in their view, granted discretion to the states to
govern the voting procedures of their own citi-
zens.1 4 The following discussion will examine the
extent to which the two rationales of Morgan remain
in force and the implications of those rationales for
the bills overruling Stanford Daily.
CONGRESSIONAL REMEDY PRONG OF MORGAN
The ability of Congress to fashion remedies
through section 5 to cure discrimination or other
state action contrary to the fourteenth amendment
is the most accepted and least controversial aspect
of Morgan. This prong of Morgan apparently
emerged unscathed from Oregon v. Mitchell since the
five opinions in that case unanimously upheld the
provision suspending literacy tests for voting as a
remedial measure."0 5 Moreover, the Court has re-
cently reaffirmed this prong of Morgan in dicta.'
6
Several commentators have suggested that the
bills overruling Stanford Daily as applied to the
states can bejustified under section 5 as a remedial
measure."07 Under this theory, Congress could cre-
ate a prophylactic remedy to deter the number of
potential unconstitutional searches resulting from
improperly obtained or executed warrants,
notwithstanding the Court's determination in Stan-
ford Daily that the Constitution did not mandate
such a remedy.1'5 The requirement of an adversary
'0 400 U.S. at 117-35 (Black, J.); id. at 152-229
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
105 More specifically, it generally is agreed that the
Justices were analyzing the second rationale of Morgan
when considering the 18-year-old provision. Professor
Gunther suggests that both Morgan rationales were at
issue. G. GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 1033. However, the
government defended the Voting Rights Act amend-
ments solely on the basis of the second Morgan rationale,
see D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND
STATE IN A NUTSHELL 249-50 (1974), and other commen-
tators see the second rationale as the one in issue. J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 692-
93; L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 267.
'Or Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
302 n.41 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("We have previ-
ously recognized [citing Katzenbach v. Morgan] the special
competence of Congress to make findings with respect to
the effects of identified past discrimination and its discre-
tionary authority to take appropriate remedial mea-
sures.").
107 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 370-79
(statements of Profs. Paul Bender and William Cohen).
103 Nearly all the bills to overrule Stanford Daiy also
provide that aggrieved citizens may sue government of-
hearing in which the third party could contest the
existence of probable cause necessary for a sub-
poena likely would reduce the number of future
unconstitutional searches. Such a remedy, these
proponents argue, falls under the power granted
Congress in the first rationale in Morgan that was
affirmed in Oregon v. Mitchell.1 9
However, there are several difficulties with this
approach. On a theoretical level, the distinction
between remedy and interpretation advanced in
Morgan may not be a sharp one. It is not clear how
a statute providing a remedy to a fourteenth
amendment violation can be distinguished from a
statute decreeing that such a violation exists. Such
a distinction may turn largely on the asserted basis
for the statute rather than on the substantive scope
of the law.110 For example, in the present case a
bill overruling Stanford Daily based on the remedial
power would differ in its language little, if at all,
from the same bill purporting to rely on the inter-
pretative power of Congress under the enforcement
clause.
Even accepting the distinction as valid, however,
Congress would still be required to develop an
adequate record indicating that an appropriate
remedy is necessary. Despite the relative leniency
of the "perceive a basis" test for remedial measures
stated in Morgan, the dissenters in that case failed
to perceive any basis in the congressional factual
records or findings."' However, Justices Harlan
and Stewart, the Morgan dissenters, did find an
adequate record in Oregon v. Mitchell to sustain the
ban on literacy tests as a remedial measure since
there was ample evidence that such tests had long
been used throughout the nation as a device to
ficials who violate the procedures established by the bill.
See, e.g., H.R. 4181, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)-(d) (1979).
'09 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 371-75
(statement of Prof. Paul Bender); id. at 376-77 (statement
of Prof. William Cohen). Eight of the Justices in Oregon
v. Mitchell upheld the ban on literacy tests as a proper
remedial measure under the enforcement clause of the
fifteenth amendment. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 2.
Given the similarity between the enforcement clauses of
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, commentators
have viewed the first Morgan rationale as consistent with
Oregon v. Mitchell. See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note
3, at 376 (statement of Prof. William Cohen). See also
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 144-47 (Douglas, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (relying on the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment to uphold the liter-
acy test ban).
10 See Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 608 (1975).
"' See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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deny the franchise to potential voters.11 2 Thus, as
was discussed above in a similar context in relation
to the commerce clause, Congress must set out
findings which indicate a need for remedial mea-
sures to deter the possibility of the abuse of consti-
tutional rights through the use of search warrants
against third parties.1
3
On its face, the "perceive a basis" test resembles
the lenient "mere rationality" test found in cases
reviewing congressional determinations that cer-
tain activities impact on commerce.1 1 4 Arguably,
however, to impose a nationwide remedy even
under the "perceive a basis" test would require a
showing that current search warrant activities
against the media and related third parties are a
national problem. A more substantial record to
that effect than the one currently before Congress
would be required to create such a showing.
1 1 5
CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION PRONG OF MORGAN
The most controversial rationale of Morgan was
the apparent power it gave Congress to interpret
for itself, through section 5, the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment. This power not only al-
lowed Congress to usurp a traditional judicial func-
tion-interpreting the Constitution-but on its
face allowed Congress to modify contrary Supreme
Court interpretations. This aspect of Morgan was
not oqly heavily criticized on its own account, but
it is not clear to what extent it survived Oregon v.
Mitchell.
Most commentators focused their scrutiny on
Justice Brennan's effort to limit the extent of this
rationale. In his footnote in Morgan, Justice Bren-
nan stated that Congress could not "restrict" or
112 400 U.S. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
113 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 371-72
(statement of Prof. Paul Bender).
114 See notes 28-35 & accompanying text supra.
" Recently, a federal court of appeals in sustaining
the constitutionality of § 103(0(2) of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 (setting aside 10%, of all funds
for minority contractors) had occasion to rely on the
remedial prong of Morgan and reiterated the "perceive a
basis" test. See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 604-05
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 960 (1979) (No. 78-
1007, 1979 Term). Interestingly, the court found "trou-
blesome" the sparse record before Congress, but never-
theless found the evidence sufficient to meet the "perceive
a basis" test. 584 F.2d at 605-06. This concern with the
legislative record parallels similar concerns this comment
has expressed concerning the record to support the Stan-
ford Daily bills. The Supreme Court's forthcoming deci-
sion in Fullilove may clarify the scope of the remedial
prong of Morgan.
"dilute" the guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment.11 6 As various critics pointed out," 7 Morgan
did not explain the distinction between "expand-
ing" and "restricting": If the congressional in-
terpretive power was grounded on a special legis-
lative competence to make findings and weigh
conflicting considerations, why could not Congress
simply interpret as it saw fit? Nor did Brennan's
elaboration of his "ratchet" theory in Oregon v.
Mitchell prove helpful,118 since he discussed only
the narrow ground of the ability of Congress to
make findings that will override the findings made
by state legislatures on the same issue.1 9 This
reasoning did not address the more general issue of
Congress' power to "dilute" a fourteenth amend-
ment "guarantee," nor did he address the problem
of which branch of government was to determine
the definition and scope of those guarantees in the
first instance.
Finally, even accepting Brennan's theory, there
remains the difficulty of determining whether a
law dilutes or expands a right.'20 In the context of
the present issue, bills overruling Stanford Daily
might be viewed as "expanding" first and fourth
amendment rights for the media and related third
parties while "diluting" the equal protection rights
of other citizens by not granting this privilege to
all persons. Such a bill might even be seen as
"diluting" the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee of a fair trial by restricting the amount
of information available to a factfinder at trial.12i
An additional major difficulty in relying on
Morgan's second rationale is determining the extent
to which it was modified by Oregon v. Mitchell.
While several commentators flatly state that the
second rationale was overruled in the latter deci-
sion, relying principally on Stewart's opinion,
12
116384 U.S. at 651 n.10. See text accompanying note
91 supra.
117 See, e.g., D. ENGDAHL, supra note 105, at 246; Cohen,
supra note 110, at 606-07.
""See 400 U.S. at 249 n.31. See text accompanying
notes 97-98 supra. The "'ratchet" description is borrowed
from Professor Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 110, at 606.
1'9 See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 105, § 10.08; Cohen,
supra note 110, at 612-13.
:2' See Cohen, supra note 110, at 607.
2 The first "dilution" is not present in those bills
extending protection to all third parties. The second
"dilution" is suggested by at least one authority. CLC
Memo, supra note 22, at 341. However, the latter argu-
ment is weakened by the fact that an accused raising the
right of a fair trial would rarely desire information that
is also sought by law enforcement officials.
122 See D. ENGDAHL, supra note 105, at 244; J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 693; Cohen,
supra note 110, at 612.
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some writers still view the issue as an open one."
If the Justices remaining from the Mitchell Court
were to retain their positions in that case, Brennan
would apply his factfinding gloss to the second
prong, while Stewart would limit the second prong
to combating instances of discrimination against
suspect groups, and presumably instances of state
action interfering with fundamental rights, as de-
termined by the Court itself. Brennan's theory
arguably supplies a basis for the bills here consid-
ered, 2 4 but the restrictive Stewart theory probably
would not supply a basis since the bills are not
protecting suspect groups or fundamental rights as
determined by the Court.
Given the split of opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell,
relying on that decision alone to discern the via-
bility of the second Morgan rationale is a nearly
impossible task. The value of the second Morgan
prong, however, must be considered reduced to
some extent merely on the basis of the bare holding
in Oregon v. Mitchell striking down the voting-age
provision as it applied to the states. At least one
writer suggests that the major modification that
the ruling in Oregon v. Mitchell made in the second
Morgan rationale was to require a higher standard
of review for the reasonableness of congressional
action than the lenient "perceive a basis" test
adopted in Morgan.'2s
In response to the uncertainty generated by Or-
egon v. Mitchell, several commentators have ad-
vanced theories that suggest modifications of the
second Morgan rationale that would still permit
Congress to retain a role in constitutional interpre-
tation. The extent to which these theories impact
on the section 5 bases of the bills overruling Stanford
Daily is outlined below. However, since none of
these theories have been adopted by the Court, it
is impossible to determine which test the bills may
have to meet.
Federalism-Liberty Distinction. One approach ad-
vanced by Professor William Cohen draws a dis-
'23 See L. TRiBE, supra note 64, at 267; Gordon, 7he
Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 656, 668 (1977).
In contrast, various proponents of the Stanford Daily
bills, in attempting to justify an enforcement clause basis
for extending the bills to cover state officials, regard
Morgan as completely unimpaired by Oregon v. Mitchell.
See ACLU Memo, supra note 27, at 48; CLC Memo, supra
note 22, at 341. But see OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 13
(doubting that the second Morgan rationale "is so firmly
established in our constitutional jurisprudence that it can
be relied on with any certainty," citing Oregon v. Mitchell).
'24 See text accompanying notes 134-47 infra.
'2 See Gordon, supra note 123, at 668.
tinction between congressional decisions as to the
division of responsibility between state legislatures
and Congress and those decisions second-guessing
the courts as to the minimal content of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 26 The latter congressional
judgment, Cohen argues, is entitled to no more
deference than the same decision by a state legis-
lature. However, the former judgment, "resolving
at the national level an issue that could-without
constitutional objection-be decided in the same
way at the state level, ought normally to be binding
on the courts"' 27 since Congress is institutionally
competent to resolve such federal/state conflicts.
As an example of the usefulness of such a distinc-
tion, Cohen suggests that section 5 would provide
support for bills overruling Branzburg v. Hayes to be
binding on the states since the Branzburg Court felt
Congress and state legislatures should be free "to
fashion their own standards' 1ia on shield laws for
reporters. This is arguably a federalism judgment,
since it constitutes a decision where a congressional
determination may be in conflict with a state
legislative determination. 1 Similarly, Stanford
Daily might be said to have partially relied on the
willingness of the Court to allow state legislatures,
as well as Congress, to develop statutory and ad-
ministrative protections against abuse of warranted
searches of media offices and related third
parties.' Under Cohen's theory, congressional leg-
islation overruling Stanford Daily would preempt
both state legislation to the same effect and a state
determination that such legislation was unneces-
sary.
There are several problems with this approach.
Apart from the difficulty of determining whether
a Supreme Court decision, or a congressional judg-
ment, turns on federalism rather than liberty con-
cerns, it is doubtful in light of National League of
Cities that the Court would be willing to give free
reign to a congressional judgment on federalism
that is in conflict with state law and has the
potential for invading state sovereignty.13 1 While it
12
6 See Cohen, supra note 110, at 613-16.
127 Id. at 614.
128 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972).
129 Cohen, supra note 110, at 619.
'3 436 U.S. at 567. One authority cites Cohen's dis-
cussion of Branzburg to provide a § 5 basis for the bills
overturning Stanford Daily. See CLC Memo, supra note 22,
at 341. Professor Cohen in his testimony before Congress,
however, did not advance this analogy. 1978 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 3, at 375-79 (statement of Prof. Cohen).
13 See L. TRIuE, supra note 64, at 271. It should be
noted that the National League of Cities Court left open the
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is true that the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer132 ruled
that the fourteenth amendment provision for
congressional enforcement supersedes the eleventh
amendment restrictions on suits against states, that
decision did not deal with the state sovereignty
implications of the tenth amendment. It is not
clear to what extent Fitzpatrick creates an exception
to National League of Cities.13 3 Thus, Cohen's theory
is unlikely to be a persuasive guide to delineating
Congress' section 5 power.
Fact-Principle Distinction. Another theory, refined
by Professor Irving Gordon,.' draws on Congress'
institutional superiority over the courts as a factfin-
der. Gordon notes that every constitutional deci-
sion by the Supreme Court rests on a normative as
well as an empirical component. To the extent that
a decision rests on empirical considerations, Con-
gress may modify the Court's ruling by making
appropriate findings or developing a legislative
record to the contrary. As an example of such a
decision, Gordon, like Cohen, relies on Branzburg v.
Hayes, which he characterizes as "shaped by em-
pirical considerations''135 in that the Court major-
ity felt the flow of news would not be diminished
if the reporter's privilege not to reveal confidential
sources was denied.
Similarly, the bills to overrule Stanford Daily may
be justified as resting on congressional factfinding
considerations.1 36 This justification, however, turns
on the determination of to what extent Stanford
issue of the impact of its decision on the § 5 enforcement
power. See 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
132 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
133 See id. at 456. Some writers feel the decision removes
any federalism concerns in the exercise of § 5 power. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 272 n.61; Gordon, supra note
123, at 683-84; OLC Memo, supra note 16, at 11. How-
ever, the Court's brief opinion did not address the prin-
ciples of state sovereignty implicit in the tenth amend-
ment and included only a cf. citation to National League of
Cities in a footnote. See 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. See also 1979
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Prof.
Mark Tushnet) (the Fitzpatrick "opinion leaves open the
possibility that a statute might surmount an absolute
eleventh amendment hurdle but fail in the face of a more
general federalism objection").
1'3 See Gordon, supra note 123. See also Cox, The Role of
Congress in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 U. CIN. L. REV.
199 (1971); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
1-5 Gordon, supra note 123, at 672.
'
3
6 The Department of Justice adopted this theory to
provide a basis for the exercise of the § 5 power. See OLC
Memo, supra note 16, at 11-14. See also 1978 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 368-69 (statement of Prof. Paul
Bender); CLC Memo, supra note 22, at 340.
Daily relied on empirical considerations. While the
majority opinion relied for the most part on a
discussion of fourth amendment principles, 37 it did
weigh factual considerations in the latter portion
of the opinion discussing the first amendment ar-
guments advanced by the newspaper: that the
requirement of a subpoena would undermine law
enforcement efforts,13 that the preconditions for
issuing warrants would protect against their
abuse,' 39 and that there was no history of an abuse
of warrants for searches of newspaper offices.
140
Under the factfinding theory, if Congress made
determinations on an appropriate record that were
contrary to the Court's first amendment factual
determinations, then the holding in Stanford Daily
could be modified and the modification would
apply to the states. While Gordon's theory has been
adopted by many of the supporters of the bills to
overrule Stanford Daily, the difficulty inherent in the
theory lies in distinguishing normative "law" from
empirical "fact," if such a distinction is possible.'
4'
Nevertheless, the fact/principle distinction is sup-
ported by language in the Morgan majority opinion
that Congress could weigh and resolve competing
considerations1 42 and in Brennan's opinion in Ore-
gon v. Mitchell explicitly grounding Congress' sec-
tion 5 power in its superior factfinding capabili-
ties. 4 3 This theory appears to be the most defensi-
ble one for the use of the enforcement clause as a
basis to apply the Stanford Daily bills to the states.
However, if this theory is accepted, the bills may
be required to pass the hurdle of a more adequate
legislative record and perhaps be required to meet
a stricter standard of review than Morgan's "per-
ceive a basis" test.'4 Such a higher standard of
review would be analogous to the standards re-
quired for Congress to justify a federalism inter-
est 45 or to impose a nationwide remedial mea-
sure. 46 In either case, the legislative record cur-
rently before Congress may not be adequate to
meet a higher standard of review.
147
Implicit Limits Theory. A third theory has been
137 436 U.S. at 547-60.
1
3
8 Id. at 560.
139 Id. at 565.
140 Id. at 566.
141 See L. TRIE, supra note 64, at 271. Professor Gordon
recognizes this difficulty. Gordon, supra note 123, at 674.
14 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
143 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
144 See Gordon, supra note 123, at 668. See also text
accompanying note 123 supra.
145 See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
146 See text accompanying notes 111-15 supra.
147 See text accompanying notes 18-27 supra.
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advanced by Professor Laurence Tribe. Tribe ar-
gues that the efforts to justify or supplement the
"ratchet" limitation on the second Morgan rationale
are misplaced, since congressional legislation,
whether grounded in section 5 or other grants of
congressional power, must be consistent with the
Bill of Rights and other limits on federal author-
ity. 148 Tribe suggests a two-step process, which he
argues was followed by the Court in Morgan: "an
inquiry first into whether congressional legislation
rationally relates to the purposes and objectives of
the fourteenth amendment, and second into
whether such legislation is consistent with the Bill
of Rights and other external restraints.'
149
The bills at issue here arguably would survive
the Tribe analysis. If protection of first and fourth
amendment rights is a "purpose" of the fourteenth
amendment, then the Stanford Daily bills satisfy the
first inquiry. The bills apparently satisfy the second
inquiry since they expand guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. However, the bills also must avoid incon-
sistency with other external restraints on congres-
sional power. Federalism, as interpreted in National
League of Cities, would be among the external re-
straints the bills must confront, and the same anal-
ysis as outlined in the discussion of the commerce
clause then would be applicable. The bills still
would have to be measured against the tenth
amendment barrier prohibiting invasion of state
sovereign functions.
15°
Underenforcement Theory. A fourth theory of the
"ratchet" limitation has been developed by Profes-
sor Lawrence Sager.151 Sager argues that Congress
can exercise its section 5 power to enforce and
expand constitutional claims when the federal ju-
diciary has declined to uphold the claim based on
"institutional" concerns of the judiciary. These
institutional barriers, such as the mere rationality
standard of review in equal protection adjudica-
tion, which the Court justifies on the basis of a
judicial incompetence to make complex policy de-
terminations, should not prevent the exercise of the
section 5 power to expand rights since the legal
scope of a constitutional norm is not coterminous
148 L. TRIBE, supra note 64, at 271-72.
1
49 Id. at 271 n.61.
150 Professor Tribe, in his discussion of Stanford Daily in
the supplement to his constitutional law treatise, stated
that under § 5 Congress "certainly has authority to con-
trol searches by state officials in order to extend fuller
protection to what the Congress reasonably determines
to be constitutional guarantees." Id. at 75 n.97 (Supp.
1979).
' Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
with the scope of federal judicial enforcement.1
5 2
However, when a court decision "is firmly rooted
in analytical rather than institutional percep-
tions,"' 55 Congress may noi expand the constitu-
tional norm limited by the decision. The Stanford
Daily Court's refusal to expand the first and fourth
amendment rights of the student newspaper clearly
rests on analytical, not institutional, grounds. As
noted above,154 the Court relied on principles of
the fourth amendment and did not decline to
address factual considerations, as the Court essen-
tially does when it declines to overturn a federal or
state law by evaluating the law under the mere
rationality test of equal protection analysis. Thus,
Sager's theory does not provide a basis to support
the Stanford Daily bills.
IV. CONCLUSION
A legitimate concern for protecting the first and
fourth amendment rights of the institutional me-
dia, as well as other related third parties, has
motivated Congress to consider legislation that will
mandate procedures to modify the Court's holding
in Stanford Daily. However,; members of Congress
must be cognizant" of the constitutional limits in-
herent in the commerce clause and section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment when applying procedures
to state officials. I
The lack of an adequate ,factual record demon-
strating the need for the bills to reach the states
may prove to be the critical element in any judicial
determination of the constitutionality of the pro-
posed legislation. Under commerce clause reason-
ing, there is virtually no data to suggest that the
small number of warranted searches of media of-
fices and related third parties has had any effect
on the media's ability to g6ather and disseminate
news and thereby have a sufficient impact on
commerce to trigger Congress' commerce power.
Likewise, there, is admittedly little systematic data
available to predict the impact of the Privacy
Protection Act on the functioning of state and local
law enforcement efficiency. The deterrent effect of
the potential for warranted searches immeasurably
may affect the media's ability to engage in com-
merce so as to be reached, if only at the extreme
margin, by the commerce power. Likewise, the
invasion of state sovereignty prohibited by the
tenth amendment turns on the nature, not weight,
of the state function impaired by the federal law.
'21d. at 1217-18.
'53 Id. at 1241.
154 See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
Search warrants serve crime-detection and evi-
dence-gathering functions of state and local offi-
cials, crucial parts of the law enforcement appara-
tus.
Under the reasoning of section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment, however, the lack of an ade-
quate factual record may prove crucial. The ability
of Congress to fashion remedies under section 5
must be a response to evidence that a remedy is
necessary. The ability of Congress to interpret the
fourteenth amendment under section 5 has been
justified in at least four ways. The fact/principle
distinction relies on Congress developing an ade-
quate record to refute the factual determinations
made by the Court. The underenforcement theory
by its own terms is not applicable to the bills
concerned here. Both the implicit limits theory and
the federalism/liberty distinction run into the
roadblock of tenth amendment federalism. Thus,
the enforcement clause basis for applying the bills
overruling Stanford Daily to the states is as dubious
a rationale as is the commerce clause basis.
Federalism concerns, however, point toward the
most satisfactory resolution of the issue: both fed-
eral and state governments may respond separately
to Stanford Daily as they see fit. The Department of
Justice has already developed procedures for fed-
eral officials concerning third-party searches,
155
and several states have followed suit, or are ex-
pected to, with statutes governing their own offi-
cials." The ability of the federal and state systems
to separately respond to Stanford Daily represents




'55 See generallyJustice Department Policy Hearings, note 61'
sup ra.
'6See [1979] 5 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) (News Notes,
July 10, 1979) (17 states considering legislation to limit
impact of Stanford Daily).
157 The American Bar Association has reached the
same conclusion. At the 1979 Annual A.B.A. Meeting,
the House of Delegates refused to endorse a resolution
submitted by the A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice that
conditionally endorsed the Carter administration's First
Amendment Privacy Protection Act of 1979. See House
Rejects Move to Overturn Zurcher, 65 A.B.A. J. 1289 (1979).
The resolution recommended support for the Privacy
Protection Act only ifit were limited to federal authorities
and extended protection to all third parties. See Section
of Criminal Justice, A.B.A. House of Delegates Report
with Recommendations 6 (August 1979) (unpublished
report). The report argued that in light of National League
of Cities v. Usery it was "most appropriate" for the federal
and state systems to fashion their own standards. Id. at 8.
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